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THE SCHOOL OF LAW
Professor Israel Treiman is on leave of absence to become
Chief Attorney of the St. Louis division of the Federal Office of
Price Administration.
The curriculum of the School of Law has been placed upon an
accelerated basis during the national emergency. The present
senior class will be graduated in April, and a twelve week sum-
mer session will be offered between June 15 and September 3,
in which students may earn twelve semester hours of credit.
NOTES
FEDERAL APPLICATION OF STATE CHOICE-OF-LAW
RULES AND DUE PROCESS
A Texas citizen made application in New York to a New
Jersey corporation for insurance on his life. The policy named
as beneficiaries members of a New York common law association,
who were then creditors, and the insurer delivered the policy to
the applicant in New York. The association ceased to do business
and a new one was created in New York for the sole purpose of
paying premiums on the earlier policy; a trustee was appointed
to receive the benefits. Subsequently the right to change bene-
ficiaries was relinquished, in consideration for which the wife
of the insured was irrevocably given a share in the proceeds.
Thereafter three members of the association executed an assign-
ment of their interests to previously disinterested parties in New
York. On the death of insured his administrator instituted a
claim to the proceeds in a federal court in Texas. Under a rule
of policy which obtains only in Texas a beneficiary cannot pre-
vail unless he has an insurable interest at the time of death, and
the benefits inure to the estate of the insured.1 The adminis-
trator therefore claimed that public policy made the law of Texas
applicable in the federal courts.2 The insurance company inter-
1. Cheeves v. Anders (1894) 87 Tex. 287, 28 S. W. 274; Wilke v. Finn
(1981) 39 S. W. (2d) 836. See Hallen, The Texas Rule of Insurable Inter-
est in Life Insurance (1981) 9 Tex. L. Rev. 333, 339.
2. There has been no Texas case deciding that Texas public policy makes
the Texas rule of insurable interest in life insurance cases applicable in a
19421
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pleaded the trustee of the association, deposited the amount due,
and was discharged. The district court found the transaction
to be a New York contract and held, as a conflict of laws rule,
that the law of New York controlled; judgment was rendered
for the defendant, trustee. The circuit court of appeals affirmed
this judgment and stated that application of the Texas rule would
violate the due process of laws provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
this decision and held that, under the rule in Erie R. R. v. Tomp-
kins,4 federal courts must apply the conflict of laws rule of the
state in which the court is sitting ;5 the case was remanded with
directions that the conflict of laws rule of Texas be determined
and applied. The opinion considered the constitutional question
which would be raised if the federal district. court in Texas were
to find that Texas public policy required application of its local
rule of insurable interest in this conflict of laws situation; the
court indicated that application of Texas law would not violate
the Constitution. 6
The decision makes necessary a re-examination of this ques-
tion: In what choice-of-law situations will the Supreme Court of
the United States hold that application of the law of the forum
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ?7
conflict of laws situation: see the dissenting opinion of Judge Clark in
New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 665, 668.
3. Griffin v. McCoach (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 261.
4. (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 114 A. L. R. 1487.
5. The applicability of Erie R. R. "v. Tompkins to state choice-of-law
rules was left open in Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1938) 304 U. S.
202, 208. But later cases have held that a federal court is bound to follow
the conflict of laws rule of the state in which it is sitting: Klaxon v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. (1941) 313 U. S. 487; Sampson v. Channell (C. C.
A. 1, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 754, 128 A. L. R. 394, noted in (1941) 26 WASH-
INGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 244; Note (1941) 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113. Com-
pare New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence (C. C. A. 2, 1939)
104 F. (2d) 665.
6. Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U. S. 498, 507.
7. For a further treatment of the problems arising under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the full faith and credit clause
in conflict of laws situations, see: Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Consti-
tution and the Choice of Law (1939) 25 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY
27; Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System (1936) 20 Minn.
L. Rev. 140; Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Consti-
tutional Law (1931) 15 Minn. L. Rev. 161; Langmaid, The Full Faith and
Credit Required for Public Acts (1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383; Field, Judicial
Notice and Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (1928)
12 Minn. L. Rev. 439; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review
State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev.
533; Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
<1919) 28 Yale L. J. 421.
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It is to be noted that a question of due process may possibly
arise in several situations: (1) When the forum applies its
statutory law in disregard of the properly applicable statutory
law of a sister-state. The clause has several times been held to
be violated.8 (2) When the forum applies its statutory law in
disregard of the properly applicable judge-made law of a sister-
state. Several cases have held the clause to be violated. 9 (3)
When the forum applies its judge-made law in disregard of the
properly applicable statutory law of a sister-state. There has
been no case squarely holding the clause to be violated, but
numerous dicta support the view that the Supreme Court will
apply the constitutional sanction should this situation arise.A
8. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens (1900) 178 U. S. 389; Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 74 A. L. R 701 (Involving a statute
of a foreign country); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co. (1934) 292 U. S. 143, 92 A. L. R. 928. A number of other cases
indicate that the due process clause may successfully be invoked in this
type of situation, though the Court has often used language pursuant to
the full faith and credit clause: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1914)
284 U. S. 149; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken (1924) 266 U. S. 389.
Hilpert & Cooley, supra note 7, at 50, state: "* * * An erroneous appli-
cation of the statute law of the forum in disregard of the statute law of
a sister-state may be at the same time a denial of due process and of
full faith and credit." See also dicta in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Comm. (1935) 294 U. S. 532, 544, and Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. (1939) 306 U. S. 493, 500.
9. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357; but see
contra Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing (1922) 259 U. S. 209. Other cases
hold the due process clause properly applicable to this type of situation
though the Court only made vague references to the statute in the sister-
state: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1914) 234 U. S. 149; Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunken (1924) 266 U. S. 389. Hilpert & Cooley, supra note 7,
at 50, state: "There seems to be no reason to question that the same result
would be reached in any case where the local statute was improperly applied,
regardless of whether the competing law was statutory or judge-made, * * *."
10. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 74 A. L. R. 701; Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934) 292 U. S.
143, 92 A. L. R. 928; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm.
(1935) 294 U. S. 532; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm. (1939) 306 U. S. 493; Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U. S. 498.
When the sister-state rule is statutory (whether the forum rule is common
law or statutory) the full faith and credit clause would more likely be
applicable. See: Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper (1932) 286 U. S. 145;
Clark v. Williard (1934) 292 U. S. 112, (1935) 294 U. S. 211; Broderick v.
Rosner (1935) 294 U. S. 629; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates
(1936) 299 U. S. 178. But see: Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co.
(1933) 289 U. S. 439; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm.
(1935) 294 U. S. 532; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm. (1939) 306 U. S. 493; Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. (1941)
813 U. S. 487; Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express (1941) 62 S. Ct. 241.
But full faith and credit is not applicable when the forum refuses to
apply a statute of a foreign country: Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay (1912)
223 U. S. 185; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick (1930) 281 U. S. 397. When a
statute of a foreign country is involved, unless the due process clause were
1942"1 NOTES
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(4) When the forum applies its judge-made law in disregard
of the properly applicable judge-made law of a sister-state. It
is conceivable that the Fourteenth Amendment would be violated,
but no case has squarely so held.-
If the Supreme Court were to hold that the due process clause
is available as a basis for review in each of the above mentioned
situations, conflict of laws would then become a mere matter of
constitutional law.1 But the Supreme Court, by self-imposed
limitations, has refused to extend constitutional review to the
entire field of possible misapplication of proper rules.1 Thus
far the Court has refused to apply the sanction of the due process
clause, which is considered herein, except when broad national
interests have been involved ;14 even in such situations the Court
applicable, there would be no constitutional sanction preventing unreason-
able application of the local law. Compare Santovincenzo v. Egan (1931)
284 U. S. 30; Missouri v. Holland (1920) 252 U. S. 416.
11. It has been asserted that the Supreme Court of the United States
will not hold the due process clause applicable to this type of situation.
This view is premised upon Kryger v. Wilson (1916) 242 U. S. 171, and
Marin v. Augedahl (1918) 247 U. S. 142 which have never been expressly
overruled. The Supreme Court will not hold an error of a state court in
determining its own common law to be a violation of the due process clause;
this doctrine has been suggested as the reason why the Supreme Court
will not hold the clause applicable to this type of conflict of laws situation.
For a criticism of the doctrine itself, see Schofield, The Supreme Court of
the United States and the Enforcement of State Law by State Courts
(1908) 3 III. L. Rev. 195. It does not necessarily follow from the doctrine
that the due process clause may not be violated by an improper application
of local common law in a choice-of-laws situation. Several writers have
suggested that the due process clause should apply. See: Ross, supra note
7, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 161, 180; Hilpert & Cooley, supra note 7, at 51. The
latter supported their position by citing dicta from Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co. (1912) 225 U. S. 111, 137; Young v. Masci
(1933) 289 U. S. 253, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 79-80,
and John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates (1936) 299 U. S. 178, 182.
Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U. S. 498, 134 A. L. R. 1462, however,
clearly suggests that a due process question may be raised in this type
of situation; it is true that the clause was not successfully invoked in the
Griffin case but it is equally apparent that the Supreme Court did not
refuse to apply the clause because it involved the application of the com-
mon law of the forum.
12. Hilpert & Cooley, supra note 7, at 57, state: "* * * it may be said
that the Court's decisions have exposed a power in the Constitution which,
applied to its logical extreme, would enable the Court to dictate the proper,
and the only proper, result in each case. But, at the same time, the Supreme
Court in revealing this power has laid the basis for rules restricting its
expansion to that logical extreme."
13. Ibid.
14. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court of the United States
will not apply the constitutional sanctions except when broad national inter-
ests are involved. See: Note (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 291, 299; Comment (1937)
22 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 430, 432. This assertion is also based
upon Kryger v. Wilson (1916) 242 U. S. 171. This note does not consider
the merits of the suggestion but for a very persuasive reply to the asser-
tion, see Hilpert & Cooley, supra note 7, at 49.
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must deem misapplication of the local law to have been unreason-
able and prejudicial before that clause may successfully be in-
voked. 1,5 But when will the Court deem application of the law
of the forum to be "unreasonable" and "prejudicial"? The con-
tent of these terms will depend upon the approach by the Su-
preme Court to the problem; hence an examination of particular
cases is essential.
The fundamental approach by the Supreme Court in deter-
mining the properly applicable law has undergone no material
change in the development of the due process sanction to this
type of problem. A balancing of jurisdictional contacts of the
respective states was essential in determining which law applied,
even in the earliest cases. The consequences of this initial balanc-
ing appeared in the decision that the transaction was or was not
properly governed by the law of the forum; but the language
in the opinions did not express the fact that the Court had con-
sidered the jurisdictional contacts. The opinions indicate only
that one law properly applied to a given transaction. It is be-
lieved that these results merely announced conclusions on prior
considerations by the Court which were not made express in the
opinions. Thus when the Supreme Court declared that the law
of the forum constitutionally applied, the opinions do not neces-
sarily mean that the law of the sister-state might not have been
held equally applicable had the sister-state been the forum. The
opinions in the early cases rely upon only a few jurisdictional
contacts, whereas recent opinions evidence consideration of a
large variety of factors from which the governmental interest
of the forum is spelled out and determined to be sufficient or
insufficient. It is noteworthy that a substantial number of due
process cases have involved insurance contracts.
The first decision under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment was that in Allgeyer v. Louisiana."e Applica-
tion of a Louisiana statute penalizing any act done in that state
to effect marine insurance on property then in Louisiana with a
company not authorized to do business in that state was held to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. An open marine policy had
15. Hilpert & Cooley, supra note 7, at 56, state: "To the litigant this
means that his contentions as to choice of law will involve constitutional
issues only in extreme cases where a state court has done more than com-
mit error in interpreting conflict of laws dogma. He must have suffered
treatment which seems plainly prejudicial and based on no proper interest
of the state which has jurisdiction of his case." See also dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Brandeis in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246
U. S. 357, 883.
16. (1897) 165 U. S. 578.
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been applied for and delivered in New York and the insured later
mailed from Louisiana a communication causing the policy to
attach to designated property within that state. The mere act
of notification and the presence of the property within the forum
were deemed insufficient to justify legislative jurisdiction over
a contract held to be made, executed, and performable in New
York.18 Conversely, the restraint of the due process clause was
not applied in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens.19 It was there
held that Missouri properly applied its non-forfeiture statute to
a life insurance policy applied for by and delivered in Missouri
to a citizen of that state. The Court was influenced by the public
policy behind non-forfeiture legislation,20 and the opinion in the
Cravens case relied chiefly upon the factor of the place of de-
livery. But narrow and rigid language relating to the rule of
the place of delivery did not adequately explain the decision and
unfortunately occasioned great difficulty in later cases.
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head2' a citizen of New Mexico,
temporarily in Missouri, made application to a New York cor-
poration for insurance on his life; the policy was to be delivered
to a friend in Missouri and subsequently to be turned over to the
insured when he again came to Missouri. Nine years later in
New Mexico the insured transferred the policy to his daughter,
also domiciled in that state; thereafter she made application
in New Mexico for a loan on the policy. The loan was not repaid
and the policy was forfeited in accordance with the law of New
York and New Mexico, but not according to provisions of a Mis-
souri statute. After death of the insured, the daughter brought
suit on the policy in Missouri and the state court held in her
favor. But the Supreme Court, assuming Missouri's control over
the contract of insurance, held that such control did not justify
application of the Missouri non-forfeiture statute to the subse-
quent loan agreement made elsewhere between non-residents
17. Legislative jurisdiction has been defined as the right or competence
of a state by its laws to control the consequences of given events. See
Restatement, Conflicts (1934) §§59-64. It is said that the problem is the
same whether "laws" are statutory or judge-made. See Ross, supra note 7,
15 Minn. L. Rev. at 178.
18. See Osborn v. Ozlin (1940) 310 U. S. 53, 66, wherein Mr. Justice
Frankfurter doubted the validity of the Allgeyer case as still being law.
19. (1900) 178 U. S. 389.
20. All too frequently forfeitures had caused policy-holders to lose
their accumulated reserves as well as their policies; even those who did
not lose their policies were adversely affected by inadequate supervision
of funds and dubious participating and gambling schemes under the tontine
and semi-tontine policies. See Hendrick, The Story of Life Insurance (1905).
21. (1914) 234 U. S. 149.
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of the forum. The Head case rests upon peculiar facts and can-
not be said necessarily to hold that loan agreements 'are to be
treated as separate and independent from the contract of insur-
ance. There the premiums, and possibly the benefits, were pay-
able in New Mexico and none of the parties was resident in
Missouri; on such facts it would be essentially unfair to apply
Missouri law to the loan agreement made elsewhere by non-resi-
dents simply because the insurance policy had been fortuitously
but technically made in Missouri. On the other hand, when the
policy is clearly controlled by the forum the same jurisdictional
factors which justify a sufficient governmental interest in that
contract also justify control of the loan agreement applied for
in that state.22
The unfortunate and unnecessary inference of separability in
the Head case28 was followed in New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge.2' That case declared that a loan agreement, made between
a resident of Missouri and a New York corporation and pursuant
to an admittedly Missouri policy, was improperly controlled by
the Missouri non-forfeiture statute. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dis-
senting, made express what was implicit in the opinions in the
Cravens and Head cases; namely, in determining whether the
forum had misapplied its law, there was a balancing of jurisdic-
tional contacts from which a sufficient or insufficient legislative
jurisdiction was determined. Mr. Justice Brandeis denied that
the loan agreement should be treated as independent of the origi-
nal insurance contract and asserted that the test of constitution-
ality should be based upon the Court's answer to the following
questions:
Is the subject-matter within the reasonable scope of regu-
lation? Is the end legitimate? Are the means appropriate
to the end sought to be obtained? If so, the act [of the
22. The loan agreement cases involve the question of whether, on de-
fault of premium payments, the loan operates to reduce the benefits pay-
able under the converted policy or the accumulated reserve of the original
policy, or both. If it is to be paid out of the accumulated reserve, a reduc-
tion in the amount to be applied to the purchase of a converted policy would
result; thus there would be a reduction in the amount to be paid the bene-
ficiary if the reserve were taken for paid-up insurance, or there would be
a reduction in the length of time the insurance would be in effect if the
reserve were taken for extended insurance.
If the loan agreements are held to be separate and independent from
the contract of insurance, the forum's legislative jurisdiction over the policy
itself could be effectively defeated.
23. It is noteworthy that the question of separability was left open in
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1914) 234 U. S. 149, 165.
24. (1918) 246 U. S. 357.
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forum] must be sustained, unless the court is satisfied that
it is clearly an arbitrary and unnecessary interference with
the right of the individual in his personal liberty.
25
The Dodge case is inconsistent with considerations which
largely influenced the decisions in the Cravens and Head cases ;21
it is apparent that the Court was in difficulty because the under-
lying factors compelling those decisions had not been expressly
stated. This difficulty is further illustrated in the decisions by
the Supreme Court in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing27 and
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken.2 In the Liebing case it was held
that the loan provisions in a Missouri insurance policy consti-
tuted an irrevocable offer which was accepted by the later appli-
cation for a loan made in Missouri by a citizen of that state;
hence the Missouri non-forfeiture statute was properly applicable
to the loan agreement. Mr. Justice Holmes distinguished the
Dodge case on the narrow ground that the policy in the Liebing
case contained a binding promise to make the subsequent loan,
whereas the policy in the Dodge case merely contemplated a loan.
The policy in the Dodge case provided that "cash loans can be
obtained,' ' 29 while in the Liebing case the policy provided that
"the company will * * * loan amounts within the limits of the
cash surrender value," etc.3 The distinction made is technically
possible but very tenuous. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken31
the Court held that Texas courts could not constitutionally apply
a local statute to a loan contract based upon an insurance policy
issued upon a demand emanating from Texas pursuant to a con-
vertible provision in a prior Tennessee contract. The subsequent
insurance policy and loan agreements were held to be subsidiary
agreements and properly controlled by the law of the original
contract, despite the fact that insured was a resident of Texas
at the time of applications for the converted policy and for the
loan under it; and, by analogy to the Liebing case, the insured
had a right to the loan which, although applied for in Texas,
was subject to the rules relating to the Tennessee contract.
As indicated above, the unfortunate rigidity of language in
early opinions gave rise to an improper result in the Dodge case,
and made technical refinements necessary in order to reach satis-
25. Id. at 382.
26. See notes 20 and 22, supra.
27. (1922) 259 U. S. 209.
28. (1924) 266 U. S. 389.
29. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357, 373.
30. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing (1922) 259 U. S. 209, 214.
31. (1924) 266 U. S. 389.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/10
factory results in the Liebing and Dunken cases. However these
refinements indicate a growing recognition of the many under-
lying factors on which the forum may rest its claim for legisla-
tive jurisdiction. In the opinions in the foregoing cases the
Court had not frankly revealed the balancing of jurisdictional
contacts, and there was still no indication that each of several
states might have a sufficient governmental interest to justify
application of its law if it were the forum. On the other hand,
the more recent opinions dealing with the scope of both the due
process and full faith and credit clauses in conflict of laws situ-
ations 2 have made explicit the same fundamental approach which
was implicit in the early opinions; furthermore, the Court has
frankly revealed the underlying jurisdictional contacts influenc-
ing the decisions and, in a number of instances, has abandoned
the rigid language which caused so much trouble in the early
cases. An analysis of the decisions indicates that the law of
either of several states might properly be applied to the same
factual transaction if the state asserting control were the forum
and had a sufficient governmental interest.
One illustration of the modern treatment may be seen in Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick,33 which at first glance would seem to conflict
with Griffin v. McCoach.34 A Mexican insurance company insured
a tug owned by a Mexican resident; re-insurance was effected
with the Home Insurance Co. and the Franklin Fire Insurance
Co., New York corporations. Premiums and loss settlements were
payable in Mexico. Thereafter the policy was assigned to Dick,
a resident of Texas. More than a year after loss he brought suit
in Texas. The court refused to recognize a contractual provision
82. In a number of cases decided under the full faith and credit clause
the Court has actually discussed the due process clause as being very closely
interrelated, and dicta in full faith and credit cases frequently indicate
the scope of the due process clause. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Comm. (1935) 294 U. S. 532; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Yates (1936) 299 U. S. 178; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm. (1939) 306 U. S. 493; Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Ex-
press (1941) 62 S. Ct. 241. Several opinions do not clearly show whether
due process or full faith and credit is relied upon in the decision. New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1914) 234 U. S. 149, 161, contains language
which would indicate that it rested upon the full faith and credit clause.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357, 376, asserted
that the HTead case was based on the due process clause. See Hilpert &
Cooley, supra note 7, at 49. Likewise Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken (1924)
266 U. S. 389 does not clearly set out the clause relied upon. These cases,
however, are generally treated as due process cases; the confusion arises
from the fact that either a due process or a full faith and credit question,
or both, may be raised out of the same transaction.
38. (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 74 A. L. R. 701.
84. Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U. S. 498, 134 A. L. R. 1462.
NOTES19421
Washington University Open Scholarship
234 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
for a one year limitation, valid in Mexico, and applied a local
statute voiding contractual limitations for periods shorter than
two years. The Supreme Court of the United States held that
application of Texas law improperly created a new and additional
liability against the defendant insurer, and therefore violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Quantitatively Texas had some interest
in the transaction; the assignee was domiciled in that state, the
statute was said to relate to remedy, and suit was in the Texas
court. But qualitatively the Court found these insufficient to
justify application of the Texas statute.
The Court took a similar position four years later in Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.3 A Ten-
nessee corporation indemnified itself against its employees' defal-
cations by a fidelity bond negotiated in Tennessee with a Con-
necticut corporation. The bond provided that the contract would
be inoperative unless claim be made within fifteen months after
termination of the contract, and the limitation was permitted by
Tennessee statute. Later the Tennessee corporation moved its
main offices to Mississippi where the insurer was also doing busi-
ness. Eighteen months after the bond was terminated an action
was brought in Mississippi for the defalcation in Mississippi of
an employee. The Mississippi court allowed recovery by apply-
ing local statutes declaring insurance policies on property in
Mississippi to be contracts of that state and subject to periods
of limitation longer than that specified in the contract. The
Supreme Court held that application of the Mississippi statutes
violated the due process clause. The facts that the former Ten-
nessee employer had been reincorporated in Mississippi, that the
insurer was doing business in Mississippi, that payment was to
be made in Mississippi, and that the defalcation of the employee
occurred there, were insufficient to justify application of the
Mississippi statutes. In holding application of the local statute
to be a violation of the due process clause, the Delta & Pine case
goes much further than the Dick case; the forum possessed many
more jurisdictional contacts in the Delta & Pine case and quali-
tatively they were more important than in the Dick case. It is
significant that both cases involved limitations incorporated in
contracts made in a sister-state or foreign country between
parties who were then non-residents of the forum. In the Delta,
& Pine case the Court stated as follows:
A legislative policy which attempts to draw to the state
of the forum control over the obligations of contracts else-
35. (1934) 292 U. S. 143, 92 A. L. R. 932.
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where validly consummated and to convert them for all
purposes into contracts of the forum regardless of the rela-
tive importance of the interests of the forum as contrasted
with those created at the place of the contract, conflicts with
the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
It is to be noted that the Court stated that the contract cannot
be brought under the law of the forum "for all purposes." This
indicates that the Court felt that a foreign contract may be con-
trolled by the forum for some purposes when a proper juris-
dictional interest is deemed to be present.37 For the purpose of
imposing its own rule of limitations the forum may not control
what is otherwise properly a foreign contract, thereby creating
a liability where none existed under the foreign law.38
It was suggested above that the Court, at first implicitly and
in recent opinions explicitly, has imposed the constitutional sanc-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment when it has deemed the forum
not to have a sufficient governmental interest in the transaction;
but it was also pointed out above that more than one state may
have a sufficient governmental interest in the subject matter,
in which case either may constitutionally apply its own law. The
Supreme Court has determined the sufficiency of a forum's gov-
ernmental interest by balancing the jurisdictional contacts of
the respective states with the transaction; a particular contact
will be important or unimportant depending upon the type of
transaction involved. 9
The foregoing considerations directly bear upon another ques-
tion which must be raised: May the forum constitutionally apply
its own substantive law merely upon the basis of public policy,
and unsupported by other jurisdictional contacts, when the con-
stitutional question has been raised and the foreign law properly
pleaded and proved ?40 The scope of governmental interest is not
36. Id. at 150. (Italics added.)
37. See also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm.
(1939) 806 U. S. 493. Compare Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm. (1935) 294 U. S. 532.
38. The factor of place of making may be a very important one in mat-
ters of contractual limitations, yet in other situations, e. g., the industrial
compensation cases, it is not as important as the interest of a state in the
life and safety of its citizens and its interest in accidents sustained within
the state. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm.
(1939) 806 U. S. 493. Thus a single jurisdictional contact will not be
given the same weight by the Court in all cases; a'multiplicity of factors
may enter into the determination, and the relative importance of each
factor depends upon the type of transaction involved.
39. Ibid.
40. It is well established that the foreign law must be properly pleaded
and the constitutional question raised. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson
(1919) 249 U. S. 490. See 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) 1667, §621.4.
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yet clearly determined by the available cases and they show that
it may well shift according to the types of situations in which it
is questioned; but the cases and language in the opinions indi-
cate that there must be some governmental interest which will
justify application of a public policy of the forum.
In the early development of conflict of laws in this country
the comity theory was a conditioning factor shaping state choice-
of-law decisions.41 This theory was stated by Mr. Justice Story:
In the silence of any positive rule, affirming or denying
or restraining the operation of any foreign laws, courts of
justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their own
governments, unless they are repugnont to its policy, or
prejudicial to its interests.4 2
Under the comity theory the forum was privileged to refuse
recognition of foreign law on grounds of public policy alone.
Although the limits are not clear, it is apparent that constitu-
tional limitations have cut into state freedom of action based
upon public policy.' 3 In Bond v. Hunw"4 the Supreme Court left
open the question whether, on grounds of public policy, a state
court would be justified in applying its own law. It has long been
recognized that a state court may constitutionally refuse to take
jurisdiction of a cause of action in which the law properly gov-
erning the subject matter is repugnant to the public policy of
the forum;5 this leaves the parties free to seek a remedy else-
where. But a refusal to take jurisdiction is far different from
the question here considered; here the forum insists upon the
right to take jurisdiction, to apply its own law to a transaction,
and to render a judgment on the merits.
The Supreme Court has consistently used language indicating
that mere public policy, unsupported by other sufficient interest
41. See Dodd, supra note 7, at 535.
42. Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1883) 35, §38. (Italics added.)
43. See Fauntleroy v. Lum (1908) 210 U. S. 230, wherein the Supreme
Court required that full faith and credit be given a judgment of a sister-
state despite a very strong public policy in the forum. See also: Hunting-
ton v. Attrill (1892) 146 U. S. 657; Broderick v. Rosner (1935) 294 U. S.
629; Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co. (1935) 296 U. S. 268; John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates (1936) 299 U. S. 178.
44. (1917) 243 U. S. 15.
45. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 74 A. L. R. 701;
Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper (1932) 286 U. S. 145; Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934) 292 U. S. 143, 92 A. L. R.
928. However, it is not meant to be inferred that there is no problem here;
there are a number of problems which arise even though the court merely
refuses to take jurisdiction. See Broderick v. Rosner (1935) 294 U. S.
629. See also Hilpert & Cooley, supra note 7, at 35.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/10
in the subject matter, is not enough to justify application of the
law of the forum. Thus in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick it was unsuc-
cessfully urged that the Texas statute was declaratory of its
public policy and therefore the law of Texas should be applied.
The Court stated that the forum
* * * may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its bord-
ers having no relation to anything done or to be done within
them. 7
In the Delta & Pine case the Court cited Bond v. Hume 8 for
the proposition that
Cases may occur in which enforcement of a contract as made
outside a state may be so repugnant to its vital interests
as to justify enforcement in a different manner.49
The Delta & Pine case expressly stated that public policy would
not justify application of the local law, when there was only a
"slight connection" with the subject matter.50 Dicta may be
found in closely related cases dealing with full faith and credit
which require that there be sufficient governmental interest de-
spite the existence of a public policy in the forum.-1 In Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm. 5 2 and Pacific Em-
ployers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm.53 the Supreme
Court carefully set out what it there recognized as sufficient gov-
ernmental interest before it allowed application of the law of the
forum on grounds of local public policy.
It may be questioned whether Griffin v. McCoach5- has given
an affirmative answer to the question here considered: namely,
whether public policy unsupported by other proper governmental
interest will justify application of the law of the forum. 55 There
46. (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 74 A. L. R. 701.
47. Id. at 410.
48. (1917) 243 U. S. 15.
49. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934)
292 U. S. 143, 150, 92 A. L. R. 928. (Italics added.)
50. Ibid.
51. Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 164; Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm. (1935) 249 U. S. 532; Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. (1939) 306 U. S. 493.
52. (1935) 294 U. S. 532, 542.
53. (1989) 306 U. S. 493, 503.
54. (1941) 313 U. S. 498, 134 A. L. R. 1462.
55. It has been asserted that the Griffin case has in effect overruled
prior decisions "which undertook to limit the states' freedom to apply
their own rules to foreign contracts." Comment (1941) 9 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 141, 142. It is submitted that the Griffin case on its facts does not
have this effect; moreover, it has not been so treated by the Supreme Court.
In the recent case of Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express (1941) 62 S. Ct.
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are strong reasons for believing that no such conclusion can be
drawn from the Griffin case and that this conclusion was not
meant to be inferred. The Supreme Court remanded the case
to the district court to determine if there is a Texas public policy
requiring application of its peculiar rule in the conflict of laws
situation there presented. The opinion indicated that application
of the Texas rule would not violate the due process clause. Al-
though the opinion in the Griffin case did not emphasize them,
it is apparent that the forum had actual and potential jurisdic-
tional contacts with the case. Some states hold that the place of
performance of the insurance contract, in the sense of the place
where the principal sum is payable, is at the residence of the
beneficiary. 5  If it were shown that Texas followed this rule,
the forum could be the place of performance since the wife, bene-
ficiary, resided there. Moreover it is to be noted that the admin-
istrator, the heirs of the insured, and the eestui que vie were all
domiciled in Texas.
In view of the cases relied on by Mr. Justice Reed in the
Griffin case, the factor of domicil is highly significant. The
opinion emphasized Union Trust Co. v. Gros=uG7 in which a
Texas married woman executed a guaranty contract in her own
241, 247, the Supreme Court applied the rule of public policy expressed in
the Griffin case and referred to the Dick case for the principle that "The
undue extension of the statutes and authority of a state beyond its own
borders by the expedient of rendering a judgment against non-citizens over
whose persons or property the state has acquired jurisdiction, may infringe
due process."
The most recent decision applying the rule of the Griffin case is Meinsen
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America (D. C. W. D. Mo.
1942) 6 Life Cases 848. There the court gave effect to public policy of the
forum on facts somewhat similar to those in the Dick case; the court dis-
tinguished the latter decision but did not refer to Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934) 292 U. S. 143 which dealt
with a similar problem. It is to be noted also, that the Meinsen case did
not arise on interpleader, as did the Griffin case.
56. In Clark v. Policyholders' Life Ins. Ass'n (1934) 32 P. (2d) 653,
655, the court stated: "The very nature of a policy of insurance strongly
implies that in the event of a loss within its terms, the amount coming due
will be delivered to the beneficiary. The most reasonable inference is that
this delivery is to take place where the beneficiary resides or is to be
found. Common experience and usual custom are in accord with such a
procedure." In Expressman's Mutual Ben. Ass'n v. Hurlock (1900) 46
Atl. 957, 959, the court stated: "'Matters connected with * * * perform-
ance are regulated by the law of the place of performance. ***' It would
follow, therefore, that, even if, * * * these certificates were completed con-
tracts when signed in New York, yet the rights of the parties thereunder
must be determined by our [Maryland] law." See Carnahan, The Delivery
of a Life Insurance Policy; Function and Scope of the Delivery Concept
for Conflict of Laws Purposes (1941) 26 Minn. L. Rev. 50.
57. (1918) 245 U. S. 412.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/10
name while temporarily in Illinois. Suit was brought in a federal
district court in Texas. Under Texas law defendant was without
contractual capacity but under the statute of Illinois the contract
was binding. Although constitutional law issues were not in-
volved, the Supreme Court held that, on grounds of public policy,
Texas might properly refuse to recognize a married woman's
statute of Illinois because Texas had an interest in the protec-
tion of its own citizens and because the woman was only tem-
porarily absent from the Texas domicil. The Court held that the
local rule should also be applied by a federal court in Texas. Mr.
Justice Holmes stated:
It is one thing for a court to decline to be an instrument
for depriving citizens belonging to the jurisdiction of their
property in ways not intended by the law that governs them,
another to deny its offices to enforce obligations good by the
lex domicilii and the lex loci contractus against women that
the local laws have no duty to protect.58
The Supreme Court in the Griffin case stated that the Texas
rule of insurable interest is based on "* * * a public policy
which protects citizens against the assumed dangers of insur-
ance on their lives held by strangers.159 Obviously this is more
important than an interest in protecting property as in the
Grosman case. It is apparent that the Court in the Griffin case
deemed the domicil of the cestui que vie, among other contacts,
to be a narrow but sufficient governmental interest on which
Texas might rest its public policy. This is given additional sup-
port by the Court's language used to distinguish the Dick case.
The Court stated that the rule, allowing state courts to apply
their own law when the foreign law is obnoxious to its public
policy, was not applied in the Dick case
* * * where the parties to the contract acquired rights be-
yond the state's borders with no relation to anything done
or to be done within the borders.60
Thus the Court must have deemed a sufficient interest to exist
in the Griffin case, whereas the interest in the Dick case was
insufficient; therefore the opinion in the Griffin case is entirely
consistent with prior decisions by the Supreme Court.
As indicated at an earlier point, no case has yet squarely
answered the question: May the forum constitutionally apply its
58. Id. at 416.
59. Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U. S. 498, 507, 134 A. L. R. 1462.
60. Ibid.
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own substantive law, unsupported by jurisdictional contacts other
than mere public policy, when the constitutional question has
been raised and the foreign law properly pleaded and proved?
It was suggested above that the facts of the Griffin case do not
raise, nor does the opinion purport to answer, this question. It
would be raised if the facts in the Griffin case were changed
in several respects. If the administrator, the heirs of the in-
sured, and the cestui que vie were domiciled in a third state and
suit were instituted in the federal or state court of Texas, the
opinions indicate that mere public policy would be insufficient
to justify application of the Texas rule of insurable interest.
The forum in the Dick case and in the Delta & Pine case was
attempting to create and to impose a new liability on the in-
surer when no liability existed under the law of the place of
making. Application of Texas law in the Griffin case would not
impose a new liability on the insurance company which inter-
pleaded, thereby admitting liability. Nor would a new liability
be created against the trustee; application of Texas law would
be only a refusal to recognize the trustee's right to recover, and
Texas had a sufficient governmental interest to justify this re-
sult under the facts of the Griffin case.
The fact that the action of the Court in the Griffin case created
no new liability against the insurance carrier suggests a number
of problems, as yet undecided. The remedy of federal inter-
pleader, 6' which protects a stakeholder against possible double
liability to claimants residing in different states, is of great
importance in the hypothetical situations hereafter considered.
If an insurance company is sued in Texas by an administrator
and has knowledge that a trustee also claims the fund, the in-
surer may interplead the trustee and thereby protect itself
against possible double liability by reason of a later suit by the
trustee in another state. This was the situation in the Griffin
case. If the insurance company, knowing of the conflicting
claims, does not make the trustee a party, the administrator
might still prevail in Texas, because its governmental interest
is identical with that in the Griffin case. In this situation, if
the insurer is later sued in another state by the trustee, the in-
surance company may be subjected to double liability because,
knowing of the adverse claims, the company was negligent in
not exercising the protective remedy of interpleader. If, with-
out being sued, the insurance company were voluntarily to pay
the administrator, knowing of the trustee's claim, it might be
61. Fed. Interpleader Act (1936) 49 Stat. 1096, 28 U. S. C. A. §41(26).
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subjected to double liability by reason of its negligent failure
to bring an action under the interpleader statute. If the trustee
were to sue the insurer in New York or, indeed, in any juris-
diction except Texas, the trustee would probably prevail by rea-
son of the forum's adoption of the law of New York, as properly
governing the insurance contract. In that situation if the in-
surance company failed to make the administrator a party, it
might then be held liable in a later suit in Texas by the admin-
istrator because, knowing of its possible liability to the admin-
istrator, the insurer may be said to have negligently failed to
take steps to protect itself; but if the carrier were to interplead
the administrator, it could not be subjected to a later suit.
It is apparent that the insurance company will know of the
trustee's claim, since he was named beneficiary; thus there will
be no situation in which the insurer will pay the administrator
and not be apprised of the conflicting claim of the trustee. But
when the trustee-beneficiary claims the fund, the insurance com-
pany may be unaware of the possible claim of an administrator;
here it is suggested that the company may safely pay the trustee,
whether on suit or voluntarily. In the latter situation, by analogy
to the Dick and Delta & Pine cases, it is probable that the Texas
court in a later action in that state by the administrator could
not constitutionally apply its own law, thereby creating a new
liability against the innocent insurance company. In this situa-
tion the Supreme Court might hold that the interest of Texas
was insufficient to justify application of the Texas rule of insur-
able interest. This is consistent with the holdings of the Dick
and Delta & Pine cases that no new liability can be created, even
though some jurisdictional interest exists in the forum, whereas
the Griffin case did not create a new liability.
One last point raised by the Griffin case remains to be consid-
ered. Under the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins62 it is now estab-
lished that the federal district courts must apply the conflict of
laws rule of the state in which they are sitting. This question
had been expressly left open in Ruhlin -v. New York Life Ins.
Co.6" and it has occasioned considerable difficulty. When there
are state decisions in which the point has been raised and de-
cided, the federal court must apply the law as found in the state
cases; but when the point has not been decided by the state
courts, the Erie rule poses a difficult problem. Theoretically the
federal courts must decide what the state rule would be had the
62. (1988) 304 U. S. 64, 114 A. L. R. 1487.
63. (1988) 304 U. S. 202.
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cause of action arisen in the state court. This problem was
avoided by lower federal courts in Sampson v. ChanneJl"4 and
New Englnt Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence.60 In those cases
the federal courts had opportunity to consider the point at issue
as falling into one of several possible categories, which could be
governed by different conflict of laws rules; the methods and
rules by which courts deal with such situations are technically
known as "qualification." In the cases just referred to, the courts
applied state rules to the points in issue, which rules were prop-
erly applicable after the qualification had been made. In the
Griffin case and in Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,°0 de-
cided the same day, the problems did not lend themselves to quali-
fication and in each instance the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the district court with instructions that the state law be
found and applied. In formulating and applying a conflict of
laws rule a state court must not violate provisions of the federal
Constitution; federal courts, applying state law, under the rule
of the Erie case, may not apply even theretofore accepted state
rules if the latter would violate the Constitution. It is for this
reason that the dicta in the Griffin case, relating to the consti-
tutional scope of Texas rules of public policy, are of great im-
portance even though the narrow decision was that the district
court must, under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins7 ascertain the scope
of the Texas rule of public policy.
HoRAcE S. HASELTINE.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE N. L. R. A.
1. INTRODUCTION
(a) The Problem
There are few phrases in the parlance of democracy which
are surrounded with such an aura of sanctity as that which en-
velops the phrase "freedom of speech." And, of course, the wis-
dom of so regarding it has long since been removed from the field
of debate. However, conceding the wisdom, and in fact the abso-
lute necessity, of preserving to the utmost degree the integrity
of freedom of speech, there remains the task of definition. Ordi-
narily, we experience no difficulty in determining when freedom
of speech has been denied. The history books abound with ex-
64. (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 754, noted in (1941) 26 WASHINGTON
U. LAW QUARTERLY 244.
65. (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 665.
66. (1941) 313 U. S. 487.
67. (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 114 A. L. R. 1487.
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